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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The District Court and this Court have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 78A-5-102. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Section 78A-3-102(3)(j). This is an appeal from a final judgment 
entered by the District Court on January 12, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court properly granted Appellee Thomas Warne's 
("Thomas") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 
2007 UT App. 407 % 34, 175 P.3d 572 (holding that the appellate court review the 
trial court's ruling on summary judgment for correctness). 
2. Whether the trial court acted within its discretion to not consider 
Appellant's argument related to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 because Appellant 
Jeffrey Warne ("Jeffrey") failed to raise the argument prior to the trial court hearing 
on Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 
2007 UT App. 407 ^ 34, 175 P.3d at 579 (holding that the appellate court review the 
trial court's ruling on summary judgment for correctness). 
3. Whether the trial court properly denied Jeffrey's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment. 
Standard of review: abuse of discretion. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 
(Utah 1993) (holding that the trial court's determination on motion or action to 
1 
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modify final judgment will be reversed only upon showing of abuse of discretion.) 
Appellant cites Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App. 475 16, 153 P.3d 768 for the 
proposition that the correctness standard applies, but the Utah Court of Appeals was 
addressing a motion for new trial made to a judge new to the case, not a motion to 
modify a judgment after a dispositive motion decided as a matter of law. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Appellant raises Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 and Utah Code Ann. §75-7-605, 
but as discussed herein, neither statute determines the outcome of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
RELEVANT FACTS1 
On or about July 15, 1991, Ira B. Wame ("Ira") and Avis P. Warne ("Avis") 
executed virtually identical trusts and wills. Ira and Avis were the parents of the 
parties Thomas Warne ("Thomas") and Jeffrey Wame ("Jeffrey"). Both of the Trusts 
contain identical Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2, which state: 
1
 Jeffrey dedicates several pages of his Brief to the recitation of his version of 
highly contested factual issues in a transparent attempt to affect this Court's sense of 
the underlying equities and to make himself appear more sympathetic. In the process, 
Jeffrey attempts to paint Thomas as a thief and a fraud. Jeffrey's allegations are 
utterly false. They have been shown to be false in the probate of Marian Smith's 
estate as well as in prior litigation between Thomas and Jeffrey. Thomas will not 
stoop to Jeffrey's level and sling the mud back, because those factual issues are 
completely irrelevant to the matter before this Court. For purposes of his summary 
judgment motion, Thomas acknowledged that the trial court had to accept as true 
Jeffrey's allegations that Ira intended to disinherit Thomas and that Ira was competent 
and was not unduly influenced in executing the Partial Revocation and Amendment. 
That is as far as this Court needs to go with regard to the history among Ira, Thomas 
and Jeffrey. 
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3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive, 
the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this 
Trust in whole or in part, including the principal, and the present or 
past undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation or 
amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written 
instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of this 
instrument shall be effective only when such change is delivered in 
writing to the then acting Trustee or Trustees. On the revocation of 
this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the 
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of 
revocation, all of the Trust property. 
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries 
are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by 
death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the 
rights and privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by 
the Trustees named herein in their fiduciary capacity. 
(R. 333-334.) 
Also on or about July 15, 1991, Ira executed the "Last Will and Testament of 
Ira B. Warne." (R. 353-357.) Paragraph 2.1 of Ira's Will states: 
(a) Tangible Personal Property - Gift by Written Statement. I 
give my tangible personal property ... in accordance with a written 
statement signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at 
my death. 
(b) Contingent Gift. I give all of my tangible personal property 
not effectively disposed of by such written statement ... to my spouse if 
my spouse survives me. If my spouse fails to survive me, I give such 
property to my issue who survive me.... 
(R. 354.) 
Avis died in 1998, never having modified her Trust. (R. 151.) 
In 2002, this Court decided Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190 
(attached hereto as Exhibit A), in which this Court construed trust language identical 
to that quoted above. This Court held that the exclusive method for completely 
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terminating a vested beneficial interest under such language was through a_complete 
revocation of the trust and a return of all of the trust assets to the settlor. Id % 14. 
On or about May 9, 2003, Ira executed a document entitled "Partial Revocation 
and Amendment to The Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust." ("Partial Revocation 
and Amendment')(R. 360-366.)2 In the fourth recital, Ira stated that he "specifically 
wishes to preempt the results of the case Banks v. Means. . . . " In the fifth recital, Ira 
provided his own interpretation of Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2. Ira concluded that "the 
word 'revoked' found in paragraph 3.2 in fact means 'revoked in whole or in part...." 
(R. 360.) 
Paragraph A of the Partial Revocation and Amendment set forth the 
"Provisions to be Revoked" and Paragraph B stated the "Provisions to be Inserted". 
All of the "revoked" provisions are replaced with an "inserted" provision. (R. 360, 
361.) 
The Partial Revocation and Amendment only amends Article V and Paragraphs 
1.1, 1.2, 3.2 and 7.63 of Ira's Trust and does not even purport to amend the entire 
Trust. Ira amended Paragraph 1.1 by restating the purpose of the Trust. He amended 
2
 The Partial Revocation and Amendment uses the terms "revocation" and 
"amendment" interchangeably. The last recital paragraph states, "the Grantor hereby 
revokes the Trust Agreement, in part, as follows... and further amends the Trust 
Agreement as set forth herein...." The last two paragraphs of the document state 
"THIS AMENDMENT TO THE TRUST AGREEMENT..." and "Grantor and 
Trustee have executed this Amendment...." Additionally, the Attestation and 
Statement of Witnesses refers to the document as "Amendment To The Ira B. Warne 
Family Protection Trust (the 'Amendment')." 
3
 In Paragraph B, the Partial Revocation and Amendment refers to the Trustee 
Provisions as being Article VI and the paragraph captioned "Trustees" as 
paragraph 6.6, but they are Article VII and paragraph 7.6. 
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Paragraph 1.2 by removing Thomas as a primary beneficiary. He amended 
Paragraph 3.2 by changing the beneficial interests from vested to unvested. He 
amended Article V by having all of the Trust assets distributed to a "Jeffrey D. Warne 
Beneficiary Trust" and then distributed to Jeffrey. He amended Paragraph 7.6 by 
removing Thomas as a successor trustee. 
Also on or about May 9, 2003, Ira executed the "Codicil to the Last Will and 
Testament of Ira B. Wame. (R. 482-484.) Ira's Codicil modifies Paragraph 3.1 of his 
Will by removing Thomas as co-personal representative and naming Jeffrey as the 
sole personal representative. Ira's Codicil makes no other changes to Ira's Will. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: NATURE, 
PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION 
On May 12, 2008, Thomas filed a complaint in the Third District Court against 
Jeffrey. Thomas' Complaint contained three causes of action: (1) a demand to deliver 
Ira's Will to Thomas, (2) a claim undue of influence and (3) a request for declaratory 
relief regarding Ira's competence (R. 1-6.) 
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, on August 8, 2008, Thomas filed an 
Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint contained three causes of action: (1) 
a request for declaratory relief regarding the validity of the Partial Revocation and 
Amendment and Ira's Codicil, (2) a claim of undue influence regarding Ira's 
execution of the Partial Revocation and Amendment, and (3) a request for declaratory 
relief regarding Avis' Trust. (R. 45-53.) 
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On November 21, 2008, Thomas filed a Second Amended Complaint. The 
only change between the First and Second Amended Complaints was the designation 
of the parties as individuals and as trustees of Ira's and Avis' Trusts. The amendment 
was required after the trial court granted Jeffrey's Motion for Joinder of Indispensible 
Party. (R. 149-157.) 
On December 9, 2008, Jeffrey filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 162-
172.) Jeffrey's Counterclaim contained two causes of action: (1) a request for a 
declaration that Jeffrey was the sole trustee and beneficiary of Ira's Trust and (2) a 
reformation of Ira's Trust under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 to comport with the 
Partial Revocation and Amendment. 
On July 14, 2009, after the close of discovery, Thomas filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 328-330) and a Memorandum in Support of the 
motion (R. 317-327.) Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought 
judgment that: (1) the Partial Revocation and Amendment was invalid under Banks v. 
Means, (2) despite Ira's Codicil and the Partial Revocation and Amendment, Thomas 
was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate, and (3) Thomas and 
Jeffrey were equal beneficiaries and co-trustees of Avis' Trust. (R. 321.) 
On October 26, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on Thomas' Motion. 
(R. 560.) At the hearing, Jeffrey's counsel provided the trial court judge and Thomas' 
counsel with binders that included highlighted copies of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 
(R. 560 p. 9). Jeffrey's counsel then argued for the first time that Utah Code 
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Ann. § 75-7-605 saved the Partial Revocation and Amendment from this Court's 
ruling in Banks v. Means. (R. 560 pp. 25-27.) 
On November 18, 2009, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision 
granting Thomas' Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety (R. 518.-552D.) The 
trial court's Memorandum Decision did not address Jeffrey's new argument under 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-605. 
On December 2, 2009, Jeffrey filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or, 
in the Alternative to Certify Ruling as Final Pursuant to Rule 54(b) (R. 523-525) and a 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion (R. 526-535). Thomas stipulated to certifying 
the ruling as final, but opposed the motion to alter or amend (R. 536-542.) 
On January 12, 2010, the trial court4 denied Jeffrey's motion to alter or amend. 
(R. 552A-552C.) Among other things, the trial court held Jeffrey's Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-7-605 argument was procedurally improper because Jeffrey raised it for the 
first time at the trial court hearing of Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the trial court granted Jeffrey's request to 
designate the trial court's ruling as a final order for appeal. 
On February 3, 2010, Jeffrey filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 557.) Jeffrey 
appealed all of the trial court's summary judgment except for the portion dealing with 
Avis' Trust. 
4
 At some time prior to the ruling on Jeffrey's Motion, this case was transferred 
from the Honorable Robert P. Faust to the Honorable Paul G. Maughan. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Partial Revocation and Amendment was 
invalid. Beginning with Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.2d 1190, this Court has 
repeatedly held that language identical to that found in Ira's Trust requires a complete 
revocation of the Trust and a return of all assets to the settlor in order to terminate a 
vested beneficial interest. The Partial Revocation and Amendment is an amendment, 
not a complete revocation, so it does not comply with the requirements of Ira's Trust 
or with Banks v. Means. 
The trial court also properly ignored Jeffrey's argument under Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-7-605. Jeffrey intentionally failed to raise the argument until the trial court 
hearing, which gave Thomas' counsel no realistic opportunity to respond. Even if this 
Court allows Jeffrey to proceed with his argument, the statute does not save the 
Partial Revocation and Amendment because Ira's Trust states an expressly exclusive 
method of terminating a vested remainder interest, which is a complete revocation of 
the Trust. The Partial Revocation and Amendment is an amendment, and even if it 
could be considered a partial revocation, does not substantially comply with the 
excusive method the Trust requires. 
The trial court also properly refused to reform Ira's Trust under Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-7-415 because Jeffrey presented no evidence that Ira was under a 
mistake of law or fact when he signed the Trust. The relevant time for determining 
Ira's intent is when he signed the Trust in 1991, not when he signed the Partial 
Revocation and Amendment in 2003. But even if Ira's understanding at the later time 
8 
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was relevant, he expressly stated that he understood Banks v. Means but chose to 
ignore the exclusive method his Trust required to terminate a vested beneficial 
interest. 
Finally, the trial court properly ruled Ira's Will determined the distribution of 
Ira's personal property because Ira's Codicil did not modify the operative provision of 
Ira's Will. Ira's Will unambiguously leaves his personal property to Thomas and 
Jeffrey equally. Jeffrey's argument related to Schedule A of Ira's Trust was not 
raised below and was thus waived. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BANKS V. MEANS AND ITS PROGENY CONTROL THIS 
CASE. 
The Partial Revocation and Amendment attempts to completely divest Thomas 
of his vested interest as a beneficiary of Ira's Trust and to remove Thomas as a 
successor Trustee of Ira's Trust, while leaving the remainder of Trust in place. 
Section 3.2 of the Ira Trust states: 
Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries 
are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue 
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as 
this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and privileges 
hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustees named 
herein in their fiduciary capacity. 
In Banks v. Means, this Court held that this exact language barred the complete 
divestment of a beneficiary's vested interest in the trust without completely revoking 
the trust and returning the trust assets to the settlor. Id. |^ 15. 
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In Banks, the settlor executed the "Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust" in 
1992, which named her children as the beneficiaries and the successor trustees. Id. f 
2. Section 3.2 of the Banks Trust was identical to Section 3.2 of the Ira Trust. Id. <[ 
4. In August 1999, the settlor executed an amendment to the Banks Trust in which 
she designated her sister as the primary beneficiary of the entire trust and also named 
her sister as the initial successor trustee. 
The Banks children sued their aunt, claiming the amendment was invalid. The 
district court granted the children's summary judgment motion, and this Court 
affirmed. This Court held that "a settlor has the power to modify or revoke a trust 
only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the 
trust." Id. \ 9. After reviewing the trust language, this Court concluded that "Ms. 
Banks reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust, specified how such 
changes were to be accomplished, and created vested beneficiary interests that could 
be divested only though a complete revocation of the trust." Id. \ 14. 
This Court then turned to an analysis of the trust amendment to see if it 
complied with the requirements of the trust. This Court found the beneficiaries held a 
vested beneficial interest, which it defined as "a completed, consummated right for 
present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute...." Id. fn. 3. 
This Court found the amendment attempted to completely divest the children of their 
vested beneficial interest, and, according to the terms of the trust, the only way to 
accomplish such a result was to: (1) completely revoke the trust and (2) return all of 
the trust assets to the settlor. Id. ^ 15. This Court found the amendment was not a 
10 
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complete revocation and the assets had not been returned to the settlor, so neither 
requirement was met, and the amendment was invalid. Id. f 16. 
This Court followed Banks with Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 
2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589. In 1987, Mr. Flake created a trust naming his soon-to-be 
wife and his children from a prior marriage as the beneficiaries. In 1998, Mr. Flake 
executed a complete restatement of the trust, which reduced but did not eliminate his 
wife's share. After Mr. Flake's death, Mrs. Flake sued the trust, claiming the 1998 
restatement was invalid for a number of reasons, including the holding of Banks. 
Mrs. Flake argued the 1998 restatement was not a complete revocation, so it could not 
reduce her remainder interest in the trust. 
This Court disagreed. This Court found, unlike the Banks trust, the Flake trust 
did not require a complete revocation and under such language, "there is no 
requirement of revocation where the beneficial interest is simply modified or 
amended but not terminated." Id. \ 17. 
Thus, in Flake, this Court affirmed its holding in Banks, but distinguished both 
the trust language and the nature of the change to the beneficial interest. However, in 
the case at bar, the trust language and the attempted complete termination of the 
beneficial interest are the same as were present in Banks, 
In Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d 750, this Court again confirmed 
Banks, This Court stated, "Under the clear precedent of Banks and Flake, if the 2002 
amendment completely divested Jack of any interest in the trust, the amendment 
would violate a condition placed upon the power to amend because Leona failed to 
11 
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revoke the trust first." Id. <fl 13. This Court found the amendment in Hoggan was not 
a complete divestment, so the trustor did not have to revoke the trust first. Id. \ 16. 
Thus, Banks and its progeny have consistently held that to completely divest 
Thomas of his vested beneficial interest, the language in Ira's Trust requires: (1) a 
complete revocation of the Trust and (2) a return of all of the trust assets to Ira. Ira 
did neither of those things in the Partial Revocation and Amendment, so it was 
ineffective. 
Jeffrey attempts to use several irrelevant factual issues to distinguish the Banks 
line of cases from this case. First, Jeffrey states that "Ms. Banks never had a falling 
out with any of her children." Jeffrey's Brief, p. 20 fn. 4. There is nothing in Banks 
to support this assertion, and it is irrelevant. Both Ira and Ms. Banks intended to 
completely terminate vested interests. The reasons behind their intentions make no 
difference. 
Jeffrey also notes that Ira signed the Partial Revocation and Amendment four 
and one-half years before his death, whereas in Banks, the settlor signed the 
amendment two weeks before her death. This distinction is also irrelevant. In Banks, 
this Court did not rely on the length of time between the amendment and the settlor's 
death. This Court relied on the trust language and the terms of the amendment, 
nothing more. 
Jeffrey claims "there is no evidence even suggesting that Ira was persuaded or 
compelled in any way by anyone to sign the Partial Revocation." Jeffrey's Brief, 
p. 21. That is false, but irrelevant. There is substantial evidence to show that Jeffrey 
12 
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persuaded Ira to disinherit Thomas, and that the Partial Revocation and Amendment 
was the result of Jeffrey's undue influence on Ira. However, those facts are not 
relevant to the determination of this appeal. The reasons behind Ira's attempt to 
disinherit Thomas are irrelevant. 
Jeffrey also relies on the letter Ira purportedly wrote shortly before his death 
that states the reasons he disinherited Thomas. Again, this is irrelevant, because his 
reasons do not matter under Banks. Moreover, Jeffrey admitted in his deposition that 
Ira could not have known about several of the purported reasons at the time he 
executed the Partial Revocation and Amendment (R. 505-506.) Thus, even if that 
letter were relevant, it would show Ira's lack of competence and Jeffrey's undue 
influence. 
Next, Jeffrey argues that the differences between the "amendment" in Banks 
and the Partial Revocation and Amendment here are enough to cause a different 
result. Jeffrey notes that, unlike the settlor in Banks, Ira amended paragraphs 1.1 and 
1.2 of Ira's Trust, which stated the purpose of the Trust and identified the 
beneficiaries of the Trust. Ira also amended paragraph 3.2, which states the beneficial 
interests are vested and states how such interests can be terminated. 
These are meaningless distinctions. As discussed more fully below, the Partial 
Revocation and Amendment is not a revocation, it is an amendment. Ira did not 
remove anything from the Trust, he merely changed the language of the Trust. That is 
an amendment. 
936498 1 
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In Banks, this Court held "revocation ... is not the same as an amendment or 
modification. Id. Tf 12. As discussed below, this Court has held three times that 
paragraph 3.2 requires a complete revocation and a return of all assets to the settlor to 
completely terminate a vested interest. Jeffrey asks this Court to allows settlor to 
amend away the provisions creating the vested interest. That is akin to allowing a 
settlor to modify an irrevocable trust by changing the provision that states the trust is 
irrevocable. Following Jeffrey's argument would render the term "vested remainder" 
meaningless. 
Essentially, this Court has held that, under the terms of Ira's Trust, when a 
beneficial interest is vested, it is a permanent part of the trust and cannot be removed. 
The settlor can revoke the trust, which renders the vested interest worthless, but the 
settlor cannot amend away the vested interest while keeping the trust alive. 
Jeffrey also notes the Partial Revocation and Amendment states, "Grantor 
specifically wishes to preempt the results of the case of Banks v. Means . . ." and 
gives its own interpretation of Section 3.2 (R. 360.) As the trial court found, settlors 
are bound by this Court's interpretation of trust language. Settlors cannot devise their 
own interpretation of trust language contrary to this Court's interpretation. (R. 520.) 
Jeffrey cites In re Gerber, 652 P.2d 937 (Utah 1982), for the proposition that 
the courts should carry out the settlor's intention. This begs the question: which 
intention? Ira's intention when he executed his Trust, or his intention 12 years later 
when he executed the Partial Revocation and Amendment? By Jeffrey's logic, there 
could be no irrevocable trusts or vested remainders. The terms of all trusts would be 
14 
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subject to the settlor's current intention. Such a decision is contrary to settled law and 
to the best interests of settlors and beneficiaries alike. 
For all of these reasons, Banks v. Means is indistinguishable from and controls 
this matter. This Court should reaffirm Banks and find that Ira's Partial Revocation 
and Amendment is ineffectual. 
II. JEFFREY WAIVED HIS ARGUMENT RELATED TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-605 BY FAILING TO RAISE IT 
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL COURT HEARING ON THOMAS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Jeffrey's counsel raised Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 as a defense to the 
applicability of Banks v. Means for the first time at the trial court hearing on Thomas' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This argument did not appear in any of the 
briefing Jeffrey filed in connection with the partial summary judgment motion. 
Appellate courts need not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral 
argument before the appellate court. State v. Babbell 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989). 
The purpose of this rule is to protect the opposing party from issues to which they 
have no real ability to respond. In State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App. 381, 993 P.2d 894, 
the Utah Court of Appeals refused to consider an argument first raised at oral 
argument before that court. The court reasoned, "[T]his rule protects the opposing 
party, which receives no notice as to any issues not found in the docketing statement 
or briefs and therefore has no chance to prepare to refute the unbriefed issues at oral 
argument with a reasoned analysis supported by legal authority." Id. ^ 4, fn. 2. 
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The same reasoning justifies a similar rule applicable to trial court hearings. 
Thomas had no chance to prepare a challenge to Jeffrey's argument because Jeffrey 
chose to present it for the first time at the trial court hearing. It would have been 
unfair for the trial court to address Jeffrey's argument when Thomas had no real 
opportunity to respond. Since the trial court properly determined that Jeffrey waived 
the argument, it was not preserved for appeal. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have applied this logic to trial court proceedings. 
In Tomasko v. Ira H. Weinstock, P.C., 2009 WL 4897744 (3d Cir.), the defendant 
appealed the district court's award of attorney fees to the plaintiff. Defendant did not 
raise certain arguments until oral argument before the district court. The Court of 
Appeals held, "[W]e find that the specific objections that [defendant] raised for the 
first time at oral argument in the District Court have been waived. It would be unfair 
to permit [defendant] to prevail on arguments raised for the first time at oral 
argument, a method of proceeding which can deprive one's opponent of any 
meaningful opportunity to respond." Id at 7. 
Federal district courts have similarly found they need not consider issues raised 
for the first time at oral argument. In Johnson v. General Dynamics Information 
Technology, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 236, 241 (D.N.H. 2009), the court held, "This 
court generally will not consider theories raised for the first time at oral argument, out 
of fairness to adverse parties and the court." See also Rice Corp. v. Grain Bd. Of 
Iraq, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1312 (E.D.Cal. 2008); Ramirez v. Salvation Army, 2006 
WL 1867722, p. 9 (N.D.Cal.). 
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In this case, Jeffrey did not raise the argument based on a question from the 
judge, nor was the argument an epiphany of his counsel during the hearing. As 
Jeffrey's Brief states, he came to court well prepared to raise the argument for the first 
time at the hearing. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 14. Jeffrey brought notebooks to the hearing 
for the court and opposing counsel containing the statute highlighted at the provisions 
he felt most beneficial to his argument. 
Jeffrey could have notified Thomas of this argument before the hearing or 
could have requested additional briefing when he discovered the new argument. At a 
minimum, Jeffrey could have sent the notebook to Thomas before the hearing. 
Jeffrey chose to do none of those things. He made the conscious decision to keep the 
new argument from Thomas until oral argument, when Thomas had no realistic ability 
to respond.5 
None of the Utah cases Jeffrey cites directly deal with this issue. In In re 
Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1997), and Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), this Court ruled that certain arguments 
were raised too late to be reviewed on appeal. In both cases, this Court merely noted 
there was no record of whether the arguments were raised at the trial court hearings. 
This Court did not hold in either case that the trial court must address an argument 
5
 Jeffrey notes that Thomas' counsel briefly responded to Jeffrey's new argument 
at the trial court hearing. The ability to make an "off the cuff response is hardly a 
reasonable opportunity to rebut Jeffrey's premeditated surprise argument. Jeffrey 
also notes that Thomas' counsel did not use the word "object" in that response, but 
Thomas' counsel made clear that Jeffrey's argument was new and unexpected. 
(R. 560, p. 27.) 
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raised for the first time at a trial court hearing, or that such an argument is preserved 
for appeal. The issue was not before the Court in either case. € 
In Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998) this Court held 
that, "In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first 
raise the issue with the trial court." Id. at 847 (emphasis added). Groberg v. Housing 
Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015, 2003 UT App. 67, also dealt with an appeal after a 
trial. Neither case addressed whether an argument is preserved for appeal if it is raised 
for the first time at the trial court hearing of a motion for summary judgment. 
In Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992) this Court sua 
sponte considered a statute that neither party raised. This Court decided that public 
policy aspects of the case required considering the statute. Id. at 168. Jeffrey has not 
claimed there are any public policy aspects to this case, and there are none. Thurston 
did not address the preservation of arguments for appeal. Nor did Thurston hold (as 
Jeffrey implies) that the trial court violated public policy by failing to consider a 
statute neither party raised. 
The cases from outside Utah are also inapposite. In Fraternal Order of Police 
v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the court noted that a party can 
"waive the waiver" of an issue if the party fails to note that the opponent did not raise 
6
 Jeffrey misstates the holding of Franklin Financial, asserting that "this Court 
recognized that it is possible to raise an argument orally at a hearing on a motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the party asserting that the issue had been preserved 
is required to provide a complete record to establish that the is was in fact raised 
during the hearing." Jeffrey's Brief, p. 30. Franklin Financial only held that a new 
argument cannot be raised before the Supreme Court, and noted that the appellant had 
not provided a trial court hearing transcript. 659 P.2d at 1045. 
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an issue before the Court of Appeals until its reply brief. Id. at 903. The court's 
discussion of allowing arguments to be raised for the first time during oral argument 
is dicta. Id. at 902. In Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Ariz., Inc. v. McKinney, 946 
P.2d 464 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997), Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) 
and McGinely v. Bank of America, 109 P.3d 1146 (Kan. 2005), the Arizona and 
Virginia Courts of Appeals and Kansas Supreme Court did not address the fairness of 
allowing new arguments to be raised at the trial court hearing, which is central to 
Utah's rule as it applies to appellate courts. 
If this Court allows Jeffrey to proceed with this argument on appeal, it will be 
condoning the tactic of intentionally raising arguments for the first time at the trial 
court hearing. It is quite likely counsel in future cases will take advantage of that 
tactic. Indeed, it would be against the interests of the client to fully brief arguments 
prior to the trial court hearing. Doing so will only provide opposing counsel with a 
free advance view of one's arguments. 
The Court should not endorse Jeffrey's intentional withholding of an argument 
until the trial court hearing. Rather, the Court should affirm the trial court's refusal to 
consider Jeffrey's argument related to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) and should find 
the argument was not preserved for appeal.7 
7
 Jeffrey states that the trial court erred in denying his Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) 
motion to alter or amend because the trial court did not address Jeffrey's new 
argument on the merits when ruling on Jeffrey's motion. Jeffrey's Brief p. 28. But 
Jeffrey provides no authority that a trial court has an obligation to hear an argument 
under Rule 59(e) that was raised for the first time and disregarded as untimely at the 
trial court hearing of the underlying motion. Thus, the only issue is whether the trial 
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III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-605(3) DOES NOT SUPERCEDE 
BANKS V. MEANSNOR SAVE THE PARTIAL 
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF BANKS V MEANS. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Jeffrey somehow did properly raise the issue, 
the statute does not save the Partial Revocation and Amendment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)8 states: 
The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust: 
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the 
terms of the trust; or 
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the 
method provided is not expressly made exclusive, by: 
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to 
the trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have 
passed according to the terms of the trust; or 
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing 
evidence of the settlor's intent. 
Subparagraph (b) does not apply here. Jeffrey does not argue that it does, and 
this Court has found at least three times that a complete revocation is the exclusive 
means to completely terminate a vested beneficial interest. In Banks, this Court held, 
"Ms. Banks reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust, specified how 
court was obligated to address Jeffrey's argument when he raised it for the first time 
at the trial court hearing on Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
8
 The only reported case citing Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) is Davis v. Young, 
2008 UT App. 246, 190 P.3d 23. There, the grandson of the settlors attempted to 
transfer trust assets to himself by a quitclaim deed purportedly signed by his 
grandparents, the settlors of the trust. The court held that to be valid, the quitclaim 
deed had to be "an effective revocation or transfer under the terms of the Trust." 
Id % 12. The trial court held Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) did not apply and the 
quitclaim deed did not comply with the common law standard for a revocation or 
transfer. The court did not determine whether the statute applied or not, but held the 
deed did not comply with either the common law or the statutory standard of a 
revocation. 
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such changes were to be accomplished, and created vested beneficiary interests that 
could be divested only through a complete revocation of the trust." 2002 UT 65 f 
14 (emphasis added). In Flake, this Court reiterated, "We held in Banks that 
revocation was required when terminating a vested beneficial interest," 2003 UT 17 
\\1 (emphasis added). In Hoggan, this court held such language "required a 
complete revocation to divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests." 2007 UT 
78 Tf 11 (emphasis added, quotation omitted). Accordingly, the terms of the Trust 
provide an exclusive method, and Subparagraph (b) does not apply. 
Thus, the only issue is whether subparagraph (a) applies here. 
Subparagraph (a) allows the settlor to revoke or amend "by substantially complying 
with a method provided in the terms of the trust." The Partial Revocation and 
Amendment fails this requirement because, despite its title, it is not a revocation. It is 
an amendment. 
"Revocation is the resumption by the settlor of possession and title to the trust 
property, free of any obligation to the beneficiaries." George G. Bogert & George T. 
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 998 (3d ed. 2006); In re Estate of Stern, 636 N.E.2d 939, 
942 (111. App. 1994). This definition is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's 
definition. "[T]he ordinary meaning of 'revoke' is 'to annul by recalling or taking 
back.'" Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S. Ct. 1795, 1809 (2000) 
(citation omitted). 
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Ira did not resume possession and title to any of the Trust assets. lathe Partial 
Revocation and Amendment, Ira only modified a few of the Trust provisions. That is 
an amendment, not a revocation. 
Jeffrey asks this Court to join his semantic game of distinguishing between a 
"mere amendment"9 and the somehow more substantive "revoke and insert" system 
of modifying trust language, which Ira employed. There is no difference. No matter 
what label is applied, no trust revocation has occurred. Ira only amended the terms of 
the Trust. 
But even if the Partial Revocation and Amendment is considered a revocation, 
it does not substantially comply with the terms of the Trust. Both this Court and the 
Court of Appeals have used the terms "substantial compliance" and "substantial 
performance" interchangeably. Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998); 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424-5 (Utah Ct. App.1994). In 
Reliance Ins. Co. v. UtahDept of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993), this 
Court held: 
Substantial performance exists where there has been no willful 
departure from the terms of the contract, and no omission in essential 
points, and the contract has been honestly and faithfully performed in its 
material and substantial particulars. A party has substantially performed 
when the only variance from the strict and literal performance consists 
of technical or unimportant omissions or defects. 
Id. at 1370 (quotes and citations omitted). 
9
 Jeffrey acknowledges a "mere amendment" is inadequate to completely 
terminate a vested remainder under Banks v. Means. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 4. 
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There are several ways in which the Partial Revocation and Amendment fails 
to substantially comply with the terms of Ira's Trust. First, Ira willfully departed from 
the terms of the Trust. The Partial Revocation and Amendment explicitly states it is 
not a complete revocation, and expressly rejects this Court's interpretation of 
language identical to Ira's Trust in Banks. (R. 360.) Second, Ira did not revoke the 
Trust "in its material and substantial particulars." He only changed a few lines of the 
20-page, single spaced Trust. Third, Ira did not return all of the Trust assets to 
himself. Ira did not return any of the Trust assets to himself. Ira's performance was 
flawed far beyond technical or unimportant details. It was fundamentally and 
materially flawed.10 
Jeffrey cites Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Servs., 69 F.3d 1081 
(10th Cir. 1995), which is actually contrary to a finding of substantial compliance here. 
In Joseph A, the court held the contract doctrine of substantial compliance "is simply 
a doctrine to assist the court in determining whether conduct should, in reality, be 
considered the equivalent of compliance under the contract." Id. at 1085-6. As 
discussed above, Ira's actions cannot be considered the equivalent of compliance 
under the terms of Ira's Trust. 
10
 Jeffrey argues the trial court failed to address an issue of fact, i.e., whether the 
Partial Revocation and Amendment substantially complied with the terms of Ira's 
Trust. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 27. In Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998) 
this Court held, "The issue of whether substantial compliance with the renewal clause 
is sufficient to constitute an exercise thereof is a question of law which this court 
reviews for correctness." 
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Jeffrey argues that the Partial Revocation and Amendment should be treated 
differently than the amendment in Banks because Ira amended Paragraph 3.2 to state 
that the beneficial interests were not vested. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 23. The additional 
amendment to Ira's trust makes no difference. As discussed above, this Court has 
held that an amendment is inadequate to completely terminate a vested remainder. 
Ira's Trust requires a complete revocation of the Trust. 
Under the terms of Ira's Trust, Jeffrey's vested remainder is an integral and 
permanent part of the Trust. Ira could have reduced the scope of Jeffrey's vested 
remainder as was done in Flake, but he could not completely terminate Thomas' 
vested interest without completely revoking the Trust. Taking the additional step of 
amending Paragraph 3.2 does not cause the Partial Revocation and Amendment to 
become a complete revocation or even a substantially complete revocation. It is not a 
revocation at all. 
Jeffrey also asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 "superseded" Banks v. 
Means. Jeffrey's Brief p. 25. Jeffrey provides no analysis to support this assertion 
other than the fact that the statute was adopted after this Court decided Banks. The 
statute became effective on July 1, 2004, yet this Court decided Hoggan in 2007 and 
applied Banks. This Court did not see fit to find the statute had superseded Banks, 
and there is no reason to do so now. 
There is no inconsistency between the statute and Banks. At most, the statute 
allows the settlor to substantially comply with the terms of the trust, while Banks 
requires the settlor to strictly comply with those terms. Thus, even if the statute 
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applied here (which it does not because of Jeffrey's failure to raise the issue in a 
timely manner), the statute is of no assistance to Jeffrey. Ira did not even 
substantially comply with the terms of his Trust, so the Partial Revocation and 
Amendment is ineffective. 
IV. JEFF PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IRA'S TRUST WAS 
THE RESULT OF A MISTAKE OF FACT OR LAW UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-415. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 states: 
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to 
conform the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the 
trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or 
inducement. 
Jeff claims "the Partial Revocation evidenced that Ira's original Trust was in 
fact affected by a mistake of law." Appellant's Brief at 33. The Partial Revocation 
and Amendment says nothing about Ira's understanding and intention at the time he 
signed the Trust on July 15, 1991. At most, it reflects Ira's understanding on May 9, 
2003, when he executed the Partial Revocation and Amendment 
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 comment (a) states, "The intention of 
the settlor that determines the terms of the trust is the intention at the time of the 
creation of the trust and not a subsequent intention." See also Culbertson v. Peoples 
Bank, 375 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts § 164, comment (b)); White Mtn. Apache Tribe v. United States\ 249 F.3d 
1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4, comment 
(a)); Aiello v. Clark 680 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Alaska 1984). 
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Discovery was complete at the time the trial court heard Thomas' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Jeffrey presented no evidence to the trial court that Ira's 
Trust was the result of a mistake of fact or law. The unambiguous language of Ira's 
Trust shows that Ira intended to limit his (and Avis') ability to disinherit their children 
in the future. 
At one point in his Brief, Jeffrey appears to address Ira's original intent, but it 
is just a repetition of Jeffrey's argument regarding Ira's later intent. Jeffrey states the 
obvious, that "the purpose of Ira's Trust was to effectuate the distribution of Ira's 
property after his death in accordance with his expressed desires, intentions and 
instructions." Jeffrey's Brief p. 27. Jeffrey then states that the Partial Revocation and 
Amendment did not frustrate that purpose because it represented "his intention and 
desire to disinherit Tom." Id. p. 28. The same was true in Banks, and this Court 
found the amendment ineffective. Ira's Trust limited Ira's ability to disinherit 
Thomas, and there is no evidence that the limitation was the result of a mistake of fact 
or law. Therefore, Ira's later desire to avoid that limitation is irrelevant. Ira was 
obligated to abide by the terms of the Trust he voluntarily executed. 
Jeffrey cites to a footnote in Hoggan that "the term 'vested subject to complete 
divestment' is more of an oxymoron than a meaningful legal term...." 2007 UT 78 ^  
11 fn.2. Jeffrey argues that because of this, Ira's use of the phrase must have been a 
mistake of law. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 34. Again, Jeffrey did not present any evidence to 
the trial court to support his theory that Ira did not intend to limit his ability to 
disinherit his children in the future. Furthermore, this Court did not overrule Banks in 
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Hoggan. To the contrary, this Court cited it repeatedly as binding precedent. Id. at 
^ 11-13. The footnote Jeffrey cites appears to be more of an instruction to future 
trust drafters than a shift in trust interpretation. Regardless of the Trust's use of an 
oxymoron, the fact remains that Ira's Trust created vested beneficial interests that 
could not be terminated without a complete revocation of the Trust. There was no 
mistake of fact or law here. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED 
IRA'S ESTATE PLAN REGARDING IRA'S PERSONAL 
PROPERTY. 
Paragraph 2.1(b) of Ira's Will states, in pertinent part: 
Contingent Gift. I give all of my tangible personal property not 
effectively disposed by [a written statement under Paragraph 2.1(a)], or 
otherwise specifically devised in this Will, except any such property 
which, at the time of my death, is used in a trade or business, to my 
spouse if my spouse survives me. If my spouse fails to survive me, I 
give such property to my issue who survive me.... 
Ira's Codicil did not change Paragraph 2.1. 
Ira's Codicil only amended Paragraph 3.1, regarding the personal representative. 
Paragraph 2 of the Codicil states, "All other terms, conditions, distributions, and 
provisions of my Will are hereby republished, and shall remain in force and effect." 
Summary judgment is appropriate when a document is integrated and 
unambiguous. Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App. 126 % 14, 977 P.2d 550. Ira's Will and 
Ira's Codicil are integrated and unambiguous. They clearly state Thomas is entitled to 
one-half of the personal property included in Ira's estate. 
Jeffrey attempts to show an ambiguity in Ira's Will arising from Paragraph 2.2, 
which states in part, "I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my property, not 
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effectively disposed of by the above written statement or by other provisions of this 
Will... to the Trustee of [Ira's Trust]...." Jeffrey attempts to equate the language in 
Paragraph 2.1(b), which deals with all tangible personal property not listed in a 
written statement under Paragraph 2.1(a) "or otherwise specifically devised in this 
Will", with the language of Paragraph 2.2, which deals with property of any type not 
disposed in the written statement "or by other provision of this Will". There is no 
"circularity" as Jeffrey asserts. There are no specific bequests and Ira did not prepare 
a written statement, so Paragraph 2.1(b) disposes of all personal property, and 
Paragraph 2.2 disposes of all other property. Paragraph 2.2 does not dispose of Ira's 
personal property, because Paragraph 2.1(c) specifically disposes of Ira's personal 
property. 
Even if these could be considered inconsistent, the specific provision of 
Paragraph 2.1(b) controls the more general provision of Paragraph 2.2. This Court 
has applied this rule to statutory provisions. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 
P.2d 242 (Utah 1980) and other courts have applied it to estate planning documents. 
Estate of Sawyer v. Commissioner\ T.C. Memo 1988-132, Floyd v. Floyd, 813 S.W.2d 
758,761(Tex.Ct.App. 1991). 
Jeffrey argues for the first time in his Brief that Ira's Trust controls the 
distribution of Ira's tangible personal property. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 36. Jeffrey did not 
make this argument before the trial court. Jeffrey never previously referred to 
Schedule A of the Trust, and it is too late to do so now. State v. Babbell, 
770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989). 
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Jeffrey claims the trial court "should have reviewed Ira's Trust to properly 
interpret Ira's intent with respect to the distribution of his personal property." 
Jeffrey's Brief, p. 36. Jeffrey claims that if the trial court had done so, it would have 
"discovered" Schedule A. It was not the trial court's job to review Irals Trust to 
discover Schedule A. That is Jeffrey's and his counsel's job. 
But even if Jeffrey had preserved the issue for appeal, Ira's Trust only relates 
to tangible personal property he possessed as of July 15, 1991. Paragraph 3.4 of Ira's 
Trust states that after acquired personal property "may be added" to the Trust, but 
there is no evidence that any such property was ever actually added. Furthermore, 
Schedule A does not identify any particular assets, so it is impossible to determine 
what Schedule A is referring to. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth here, Thomas requests this Court to affirm the 
judgment of the trial court in granting summary judgment to Thomas with regard to 
Ira's Trust and Ira's Will. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on July 12, 2010. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By: ^ ^ ^ 
Edward R. Munson 
Ryan M. Harris 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190 
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Tab A 
1190 Utah 52 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
2002 UT 65 
Kenneth Alan BANKS, Susan Banks Bak-
er, and Bransford Michael Banks, and 
John Does 1 through 50, Plaintiffs, 
Counterclaim Defendants, and Appel-
lees, 
v. 
Nancy A. MEANS and John Does I 
through V, Defendants, Counter-
claim Plaintiffs, and Appellant. 
No. 20001071. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
July 19, 2002 
Settlor's children brought action against 
settlor's sister, seeking enforcement of trust 
agreement that sister claimed was modified 
by an amendment under which sister would 
become the sole beneficiary of the trust The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Frank G Noel, J , granted summary judg-
ment for children Sister appealed The Su-
preme Court, Durham, C J , held that 
amendment to trust was ineffective 
Affirmed 
1. Appeal and Error <^934(1) 
When reviewing the trial court's ruling 
in a motion for summary judgment, appellate 
court considers all facts and inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the nonmovmg party 
2. Appeal and Error <S=>934(1) 
Appellate court reviews the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment for correctness, 
according no deference to that court's legal 
conclusions 
3. Appeal and Error ®=>856(1) 
Appellate court may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available 
to the trial court, even if it was not relied 
upon by the trial court 
4. Trusts e=>134,182 
A trust is a form of ownership in which 
the legal title to property is vested in a 
trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and 
manage it for the benefit of the beneficial les 
5. Trusts <s=>31 
Once the settlor has created a trust he is 
no longer the owner of the trust property 
and has only such ability to deal with it as is 
expressly reserved to him in the trust instru-
ment 
6. Trusts <s=>58, 59(2) 
A settlor has the power to modify or 
revoke a trust only if and to the extent that 
such power is explicitly reserved by the 
terms of the trust 
7. Trusts &=>1 
The creation of a trust involves the 
transfer of property interests in the trust 
subject-matter to the beneficianes, and these 
interests cannot be taken from the beneficia-
nes except m accordance with a provision of 
the trust instrument 
8. Trusts <s=>59(2) 
Under trust agreement stating that ben-
eficianes had vested interests that continued 
until trust was "revoked or terminated," com-
plete revocation was required to divest bene-
ficianes of vested interests 
9. Trusts <S=>58 
Amendment to trust, purporting to 
change trust beneficianes and successor 
trustee from settlor's children to her sister, 
was ineffective, as amendment sought to 
change beneficiary status of children, divest-
ing them of their vested interests in trust, 
but trust agreement provided that children's 
beneficiary interests were only subject to 
divestiture via a revocation of the trust, 
which amendment did not achieve 
James H Faust, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs 
J Jay Bullock, Clinton J Bullock, Karen 
Bullock Kreeck, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant 
DURHAM, Chief Justice 
INTRODUCTION 
111 Decedent's children, Kenneth Alan 
Banks, Susan Banks Baker, and Bransford 
Michael Banks brought an action against de-
cedent's sistei, Nancy Means ("Ms Means") 
seeking enforcement of a 1992 trust that was 
purportedly modified by a 1999 amendment 
Under the terms of the 1999 amendment, 
Ms Means would become the sole beneficia-
ry of the trust, while the Banks children 
would become contingent beneficiaries The 
trial court granted summary judgment m 
favor of the Banks children Ms Means 
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred 
by (1) granting the Banks children's motion 
for summary judgment, (2) denying Ms 
Mean's cross-motion for summary judgment, 
and (3) admitting the deposition testimony of 
attorney Joseph L Piatt We affiim the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment and 
hold that the 1999 amendment did not effect 
a revocation of the trust as required by the 
trust language Theiefore, the terms of the 
original trust document govern the disposi-
tion of the trust estate and the remaining 
issues are moot 
BACKGROUND 
112 On April 15, 1992, the decedent, Betty 
A Banks ("Ms Banks"), executed a document 
entitled the "Betty A Banks Family Protec-
tion Trust," which was prepared by her at-
torney, Joseph L Piatt ("Mr Piatt") As re-
quired by the terms of the trust, Ms Banks, 
as settlor, transferred certain property into 
the trust and served as trustee until her 
death on August 24, 1999 
11 3 The trust provides that upon the death 
of Ms Banks, the Banks children were to 
share equally in the proceeds of the trust 
estate and serve as joint trustees Article I 
of the trust, "PURPOSES AND BIRTH 
DATES," declares "This Trust is established 
for the primary benefit of the Undersigned 
during the Undersigned's lifetime, for the 
Undersigned's family thereafter " The docu-
ment then names Ms Banks' family as Ken-
neth Alan Banks, Susan Banks Baker, and 
Bransford Michael Banks Article IV, "DIS-
POSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UN-
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DERSIGNED," designates the Banks chil-
dren as joint beneficiaries of the trust estate 
upon Ms Banks' death Article VI, 
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," names the 
Banks children as joint successor_trustees 
H 4 The trust agreement provides that the 
trust is revocable, and that Ms Banks, as 
settlor, can amend certain portions of the 
trust, subject to the provisions of the trust 
language Article III provides 
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND 
ADDITIONS TO TRUST 
31 Rights of the Undersigned As 
long as the Undersigned is alive, the Un-
dersigned reserves the right to amend, 
modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in 
part, including the principal, and the pres-
ent or past undisbursed income from such 
principal Such revocation or amendment 
of this Trust may be in whole or in part by 
written instrument Amendment, modifi-
cation or revocation of this instrument 
shall be effective only when such change is 
delivered in writing to the then acting 
Trustee On the revocation of this instru-
ment in its entirety, the Trustee shall de-
liver to the Undersigned, as the Under-
signed may direct in the instrument of 
revocation, all of the Trust property 
3 2 Interests of the Beneficiaries The 
interests of the beneficiaries are presently 
vested interests subject to divestment 
which shall continue until this Trust is 
revoked or terminated other than by 
death As long as this Trust subsists, the 
Trust properties and all the rights and 
privileges hereunder shall be controlled 
and exercised by the Trustee named here-
in in their fiduciary capacity 
11 5 In August 1999, Ms Banks executed an 
amendment to the trust The amendment 
consists of three replacement pages inserted 
into the trust document It does not change 
article I of the trust, which states that the 
trust's purpose is to benefit Ms Banks dur-
ing her lifetime and her family thereafter, 
and names the Banks children as her family 
The amendment does, however, change the 
beneficiaries and the successor trustees 
The amendment changes article IV, "DISPO-
SITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UN-
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DERSIGNED," to allocate 100% of the trust 
estate to Ms Banks' older sister, Ms Means, 
on the death of Ms Banks, with the Banks 
children listed as alternate beneficiaries 
should Ms Means predecease Ms Banks 
In addition, article VI of the amendment, 
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," changes the 
successor trustee to Ms Means, with the 
Banks children to serve as joint successor 
trustees if Ms Means predeceases Ms 
Banks 
11 6 After Ms Banks died m August, 1999, 
the parties disputed whether the 1999 
amendment or the original trust agreement 
governed the disposition of the trust On 
October 14, 1999, the Banks children filed a 
complaint against Ms Means seeking, among 
other things, a finding that they were the 
rightful trustees and beneficiaries of the 
trust, and were therefore entitled to the trust 
proceeds Ms Means counterclaimed, as-
serting that the 1999 amendment governed 
the disposition of the trust and that she was 
the sole beneficiary After a series of mo-
tions and cross motions, the trial court grant-
ed the Banks children's motion for summary 
judgment, and this appeal followed 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1-3] 11 7 Summary judgment is appropri-
ate where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law Utah R 
Civ P 56(c), Gerbich v Numed, Inc, 1999 
UT 37,1110, 977 P 2d 1205 When reviewing 
the trial court's ruling m a motion for sum-
mary judgment, we consider all facts and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovmg party Pe-
terson v Sunnder Corp, 2002 UT 43, 1113, 
446 Utah Adv Rep 40, 48 P3d 918 We 
review the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness, according no def-
erence to that court's legal conclusions Ox-
endine v Overturf, 1999 UT 4, 117, 973 P 2d 
417, State v Pena, 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) In addition, we may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available 
to the trial court, even if it was not relied 
1 These statements were relevant to the Banks 
children s claim of undue influence or lack of 
capacity to amend the trust because of our 
upon below Bailey v Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 
1110, 52 P3d 1158, Higgins v Salt Lake 
County, 855 P 2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) 
ANALYSIS 
11 8 Ms Means argues that the trial court 
erred when it (1) granted the Banks chil 
dren's motion for summary judgment, (2) 
denied Ms Means' motion for summary judg-
ment, and (3) determined that the attorney-
client privilege did not protect Mr Piatt's 
deposition statements l When the trial court 
granted summary judgment to the Banks 
children, it found that their children's inter-
est in the trust was vested subject to divesti-
ture only through a revocation of the trust, 
that the trust was never revoked, and that 
the Banks children were therefore the sole 
beneficiaries of the trust and entitled to re-
ceive disbursement of the trust corpus as set 
forth m the original trust document 
I THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
[4-7] U 9 It is well settled that "[a] trust 
is a form of ownership in which the legal title 
to property is vested in a trustee, who has 
equitable duties to hold and manage it for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries " Continen 
tal Bank & Trust Co v Country Club Mo 
bile Estates, Ltd., 632 P2d 869, 872 (Utah 
1981)(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
§ 2 (1959)) "[0]nce the settlor has created 
the trust he is no longer the owner of the 
trust property and has only such ability to 
deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in 
the trust instrument" Id (citing Boone v 
Dams, 64 Miss 133, 8 So 202 (1886)) Thus, 
a settlor has the power to modify or revoke a 
trust only if and to the extent that such 
power is exphcitly reserved by the terms of 
the trust Continental Bank, 632 P2d at 
872, see also Kline v Utah Dep't of Health, 
776 P2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct App 1989)(citmg 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 330-331 
(1959)), accord Clayton v Behle, 565 P2d 
1132, 1133 (Utah 1977) Furthermore, "[tjhe 
creation of a trust involves the transfer of 
disposition of the other questions on appeal we 
do not reach this issue 
BANKS v 
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property mtei ests in the ti ust subject-matter 
to the beneficiaries These interests cannot 
be taken from [the beneficiaries] except in 
accordance with a provision of the trust in-
strument" George G Bogeit & George T 
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 998 (2d ed 
rev 1983) Thus, our analysis begins with an 
examination of the original ti ust language to 
see what poweis Ms Banks reserved for 
herself as the trustee and what beneficial 
interests she created 2 
A Revocation 
H 10 Article III, entitled "AMENDMENT, 
REVOCATION AND ADDITIONS TO 
TRUST," clearly reserves the settlor's nght 
to amend, modify or revoke the trust Sec-
tion 31 states "Rights of the Under-
signed [T]he Undersigned reserves the 
right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust 
in whole or in part " The trust specifies 
that "revocation or amendment of this Trust 
may be in whole oi in part by written instru-
ment Amendment, modification or revoca-
tion of this instrument shall be effective only 
when such change is delivered m writing to 
the then acting Trustee" However, the 
trust mdicates that in the case of complete 
revocation, "the Trustee shall deliver to the 
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct 
in the instrument of revocation, all of the 
Trust property" Thus, the trust specifies 
that for Ms Banks to completely revoke the 
trust, all the property must be transferred 
back to Ms Banks, after which she could 
presumably create a new trust or dispose of 
the property as she saw fit 
111 It is clear from the trust language 
that Ms Banks reserved for herself the pow-
er to amend, modify, or revoke the trust in 
whole or in part Any such changes were to 
be specified in writing and delivered to her, 
but in the case of a complete revocation, all 
the property in the trust was also to be 
dehvered to Ms Banks Revocation is there-
fore a specific provision of the trust language 
2 Ms Banks was the settlor of the trust the 
Undersigned in the trust document and the 
trustee of the trust once it was created 
3 A vested interest is something [t]hat has 
become a completed consummated right for 
present or future enjoyment not contingent un 
MEANS Utah 1193 
190 (Utah 2002) 
and is not the same as an amendment or 
modification 
B Beneficiary Interests 
[8] 1112 Next, we examine the trust 
agreement to see what interests Ms Banks 
created for the trust beneficiaries Section 
3 2 reads, "Interests of the Beneficiaries 
The interests of the beneficiaries are pres-
ently vested interests subject to divestment 
which shall continue until this Trust is re-
voked or terminated other than by death " 
By the plain language of the trust, the bene-
ficiaries have "vested interests"3 that con-
tinue until the interests are "revoked or ter-
minated " Here, Ms Banks reserved the 
power to revoke, modify, or amend the trust 
in whole or in part in section 3 1, but limited 
that power in section 3 2 with regard to the 
beneficiaries Thus, a complete revocation 
was required to divest the beneficiaries of 
their vested interests 
1113 Ms Means relies on In re Estate of 
Groesbeck, 935 P 2d 1255 (Utah 1997) for the 
proposition that the language in section 3 2 
merely proves that the trust is not illusory 
and does not restrict Ms Banks' rights to 
divest the Banks children of their vested 
interests Her reliance is misplaced In 
Groesbeck we held that a revocable trust can 
be created, without being deemed illusory, as 
long as title to the property passes to the 
trustee and vested interests are created in 
the beneficiaries, even if these interests are 
subject to divestiture Id. at 1257-58 (citing 
Horn v First Sec Bank of Utah, N A, 548 
P2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976)) That is, a 
reservation of the power to revoke does not 
make a trust invalid Id. at 1257 We fur-
ther observed that vested beneficiary inter-
ests are "subject to being divested by the 
exercise of the reserved power to amend or 
revoke the indenture m trust" Id. at 1258 
Thus, we concluded that the trust was valid, 
even though the Groesbecks had reserved 
the right to revoke the trust and created 
vested beneficiary interests that were subject 
conditional absolute [A]n interest may be 
vested even where it does not carry a right to 
immediate possession if it does confer a fixed 
right of taking possession in the future Black s 
Law Dictionary 1557 (7th ed 1999) 
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to divestiture via the specific piovisions of 
the trust itself4 Id at 1258 Groesbeck, 
therefore, does not require us to disregard 
the requirements of the trust language 
1114 Ms Banks reserved the right to 
amend, modify, or i evoke the trust, specified 
how such changes were to be accomplished, 
and cieated vested beneficiary interests that 
could be divested only though a complete 
revocation of the trust Our next step, 
therefore, is to look to the 1999 amendment 
to see whether it complied with the terms of 
the trust 
II THE 1999 AMENDMENT 
[9] 1115 The 1999 amendment contains 
two primary changes First, it changes arti-
cle IV, "DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH 
OF THE UNDERSIGNED," to allocate 
100% of the trust estate to Ms Means on the 
death of Ms Banks Second, article VI, 
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," changes Ms 
Banks' successor trustee from the Banks 
children to Ms Means, unless Ms Means 
predeceases Ms Banks Thus, the 1999 
amendment sought to change the beneficiary 
status of the Banks children, thereby divest-
ing them of their vested interests in the 
trust5 As discussed earlier, the Banks chil-
dren had vested interests in the trust which 
could only be divested according to the terms 
of the original trust document Therefore, 
the 1999 amendment falls within the purview 
of article III, section 3 2 of the trust, which 
provides that beneficiary interests are only 
subject to divestiture via a revocation of the 
trust, and section 3 1, which requires that 
upon revocation the trust property must be 
delivered to Ms Banks 
1116 Neither of these requirements were 
met Ms Banks did not divest the Banks 
children of their vested interests in the trust 
because she did not completely revoke the 
4 The Groesbeck trust language was remarkably 
similar to the trust language at issue here The 
interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked 
or terminated other than by death Id at 1258 
In that case however we were not called upon 
to determine whether a revocation had taken 
place that would have divested the beneficiaries 
of their interests Id 
trust in the 1999 amendment In other 
words, the 1999 amendment did not effect a 
revocation of the trust that would have prop-
erly divested the Banks children- of theu 
vested interests under the terms of the trust 
itself As we have previously stated, "[e]ven 
a revocable trust clothes beneficiaries 
with a legally enfoiceable right to insist that 
the terms of the trust be adhered to " Con 
tinental Bank & Trust Co v Country Club 
Mobile Estates, Ltd, 632 P 2d 869, 872 (Utah 
1981) 
CONCLUSION 
1117 We affirm the distnct court's grant of 
summary judgment to the Banks children 
and find that the Betty A Banks Family 
Protection Trust dated April 15, 1992, gov-
erns the disposition of the estate of Betty A 
Banks 
1118 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, 
Justice HOWE, Justice RUSSON, and 
Justice WILKINS concur in Chief Justice 
DURHAM'S opinion 
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5 Also notable is what the 1999 amendment did 
not do It did not change the language in article 
I stating that the purpose of the trust was for 
Ms Banks and her family thereafter or the spe 
cific identifications by name and birthdate of the 
Banks children as her family Accepting Ms 
Means interpretation of the 1999 amendment 
would thus render some language null and void 
and contravene the stated purpose of the Betty A 
Banks Family Protection Trust 
